Do not douse the fire alone! Which lessons are we ignoring in the recurrent fire tragedies in metropolitan spaces?
In 2023, on an evening in Powai (Mumbai), I heard a commotion outside a multistorey apartment in a semi-chawl arrangement that, at best, represents the simultaneous dilution of traditional housing structures. When one thinks of Powai, it largely gives a cognitive perception of a posh area surrounded by high-rise buildings inhabited by an elite rich class. Since staying near the IIT in Powai was a necessity, I chose to stay opposite to this area. I often wondered: if a tragedy were to occur, would spatial congestion impede a fire truck, an ambulance, or any disaster response task force from reaching where I live? In other words, this risk was the ‘what if’ of Nasim Taleb, the Lebanese-American Mathematician, when he described Black Swan as the impact of the highly improbable event.
The latent sense of risk came alive that day with the commotion of a fire breaking out in a multi-storey apartment directly opposite the small two-storey house I was staying in. Electricity was immediately cut. I got anxious about people vacating the apartment as small explosions gradually took hold of the ground area. The fire truck arrived approximately twenty-five minutes later. Out of these twenty-five minutes, ten minutes were dedicated to figuring out how the huge truck should enter the narrow lanes of chawl-like structures. This was the latent risk growing as all the mohalla inhabitants were out watching the rise in explosions. The firefighters managed to douse the fire in time, whatever that means. When I look back, how do I locate the simultaneous workings of time, risk, and policy in a tragedy-in-making? Certainly, it is not only non-conformity to building laws. It has largely been evident in recurrent fire tragedies across South Asia.
This year, a fire in a highly dense mall plaza in Pakistan’s Karachi claimed 21 lives. Poor safety standards and illegal construction are constitutive of Karachi’s deadly fires. Last year, the same happened at a Bangladesh garment factory in Dhaka claiming 16 lives. Officials flagged lack of fire safety clearance and even license to operate. Interestingly, in a fire at an unregistered nursing home in western Sri Lanka’s Galpatha this year that claimed 13, it was revealed that the government officials have worked with the same management as referrals to the nursing home included state’s main mental hospital, courts and police with visits from government doctors. In the Delhi fire tragedy in June 2026, the hotel’s owner responded to the Police investigation by saying, “Delhi mein sab chalta hai (everything goes in Delhi).” In my interpretation of his words, he certainly implied the urban form of property-making in Delhi and not just escaping the uniformity of property regulations. It could be a legally compliant multistorey apartment; semi-formal one under property regularization as per respective State’s policy; or unauthorized construction.
What binds these incidents in different South Asian cities is common underscoring of informal behaviours that exist within State’s logic of informality that is aptly captured in the chalta hai sentiment. Non-conformity to byelaws and property regulations present mis-framing of property redevelopment in South Asia as though properties are created outside of law. The recurrent fire tragedies are reflective of deeper risks that co-exist with urban informality and property laws in redeveloping properties. The Sri Lankan fire, and the one in Delhi in particular, indicate the collusion of law, illegality that jointly constitute the chalta hai sentiment that informs the built urban form of South Asian cities. What we must pay heed to is real estate led land speculation, increasing barriers to property law compliance and how safety can be incentivised wilfully. Also, a key misconception that equates legally compliant properties with disaster safety and preparedness only furthers private property interests by ignoring the built-up urban forms in India.
State’s logic rests on the evocation of upholding the rule of law and constitutional provisions available at the state’s disposal. Vertical housing in particular provides an optimal way of using land. When illegality is produced onto legally owned spaces against bypassing building regulations, this paper asks two questions– Is strict application of legality sufficient to reinforce building compliance by builders, populations that choose to invest in these structures and build disaster prepared cities? and which key lessons are policymakers ignoring in these recurrent tragedies (such as dilapidated building collapse, fire compliance or flooded basements) that involve property redevelopment?
The answer lies in revisiting the nature of property redevelopment, Beck’s conception of risk society with microcosms of South Asian built-up urbanizing form. These microcosms may conform to legal housing mandates but ignore the larger picture of urbanism shaping our cities today. From a disaster preparedness point of view, I argue that in housing, chalta hai sentiment– partial bypassing of housing regulations with different motivations, co-produces risk as mimicking laws is nearly impossible in these spaces. And chalta hai is an acknowledgement of informality in property redevelopment that seeks to dilute safety arrangements that mimic compliance. The key is to incentivize disaster compliance. I argue that a safe city is not necessarily a legally fit property in totality in Global South cities but it can jeopardize human lives.
Chalta hai: Property redevelopment, informality and built urban form in South Asian context
In the language of finance capital, Pistor (2026) reminds us that capitalism (and property as capital in this context) is a legally coded asset that constitutes wealth. It empowers private actors to utilize private law to govern or dominate others while resisting state intervention against these practices through the shield of public law. In Southern cities, since urban informality is largely perceived by State’s institutions through the binary of legality/illegality, Pistor’s meaning of wealth would mean an in-between chalta hai and gaps of property laws. This is so as even the legally approved buildings become a site of risk as they overarch the chalta hai behavior.
In Beck’s risk society, chalta hai as informal behaviour would imply the unequal distribution of socio-spatial risk that heightens uncertainty of disasters. Participants of property redevelopment under chalta hai include property developers, tenants and State’s officials who strike an understanding of in-between compliance that does not fully comply with law but is also not purely illegal. This can differ based on a property’s tenurial status. From established scholarship on southern urbanisms, we know that the production of property and urban space by marginalized communities is in constant tension with planning regimes and backed by constitutionalism (Roy 2009: 80; Bhan 2019: 645).
For instance, below images show simultaneous coexistence of dilapidated and new redeveloping properties.

Figure 1: Dilapidated property coexisting with a newly redeveloped property (Source: Author)

Figure 2: Redeveloping properties in ex-mill neighbourhoods of Ahmedabad (Source: Author)
A key question then is– why do builders not comply with building regulations in spatially congested areas? A builder based in ex-mill areas of Ahmedabad explained the irrelevance of following uniform building regulations in spatially congested cities. He explained that the municipal corporation doesn’t permit building for four floors. He stated how the building use (BU) permission works. Depending on the location, one has to leave 25-35% space while constructing a structure. If the permission is given, then developers build in the left out space. The inspecting official gets the BU approval and the developer rebuilds the left out space. He emphasized that it happens in collusion with the officials. However, getting the BU permission is quite difficult as it involves a plethora of paperwork.
For construction to be possible pragmatically with profit margin, it is extremely difficult for a developer to comply. This insight combines widespread non-compliance in redeveloping property structures and informality as a behaviour that generates conditions of risk. However, legally compliant properties are no guarantee of a functioning fire safety and resilient structure either. The incentive for non-compliance in Harun’s statement signifies that real estate development in congested urban areas is a sought after phenomena with expanding family size. Chalta hai operates in this cultural context where non-compliance is not simply bypassing laws including safety standards. It is the difficulty of mimicking gaps between the built forms of property speculation, property laws, weak enforcement and wilful non-compliance that prioritise profit over safety mechanisms. It generates systematic governance conditions that make dangerous urban environments both possible and profitable.
Lessons for creating disaster complaint formal and informal city
The recent Delhi fire tragedy that claimed 21 lives warranted critical responses from scholars beyond the classic Sisyphean framing of tragedies in South–Asia–– non-conformity to building laws; legal but non-compliant structures built after the plan was passed for profit motives; and lack of fire-safety mechanisms. Rightly so, they locate the problem not in consequences but focussing on urban form. The built environment of spatial congestion in old parts of South Asian cities where even legally compliant builders cannot be assumed safer. This is particularly when vertical housing provides housing/accommodation to many by using liminal horizontal space besides capital attributes of land speculation, profit-making and laws. There is a tension between redeveloping property landscapes in Indian cities, non-compliance of building regulations and bye laws, and local logics of informality as preferred behavior. Further, property redevelopment remains in demand not only for profit-making but because it is affordable to populations.
The State charges tax over electricity, water, gas supply including property tax to unauthorized constructions despite non-compliance to building laws. What if the State were to provide certain relaxations in building compliance if property developers (even of illegal construction on legal properties) were to prioritise disaster resilience mechanisms and provide incentives such as a temporary no-eviction period to tenants in semi-formal and non-formal properties? It would certainly counter the production of disaster risks posed by chalta hai. I suggest three key lessons for State’s institutions– One, unauthorized builders or non-compliant redeveloping properties are a co-feature of negotiating existing inadequate urban systems that thrive outside law. These inadequate urban systems are also found in legally owned and developing societies in tier 1, 2 and 3 cities.
Two, properties seeking regularization status find themselves in perpetual bureaucratic loop to reach towards formal tenure. Thus, planners and policymakers seeking to regulate redeveloping properties through violation of laws alone find disaster preparedness as elusive. Third, disaster preparedness passes through incorporating the chalta hai sentiment among builders and investors who don’t bypass law to simply break it or for profit. Rather, as a market-demand, it is also a necessity for low-income housing options that caters to populations who are willing to potentially risk future demolition of their properties but choose to invest relying on chalta hai.
Reconciling chalta hai, compliance and safety
This article takes a relook at the recurrent fatal fire tragedies in South Asian cities. It makes a case for changing the framing of problems of properties beyond the binary of legal, illegal and non-compliance to property laws. The recurrence of fire tragedies has a correlation with chalta hai phenomena but is not causal totality. The generation of risk is a co-production of property speculation, urban informality and profit motivation. A safe city is not necessarily a legally fit property in totality in Global South cities but it can jeopardize human lives. Chalta hai sentiment– partial bypassing of housing regulations with different motivations, co-produces risk as mimicking laws is nearly not possible in these spaces. And chalta hai is an acknowledgement of informality in property redevelopment that seeks to dilute safety arrangements that mimic compliance.
References
Akter, Sayeda and Ng, Kelly. (2025, October 15). Bangladesh garment factory fire kills at least 16. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/crexjqpw557o
Al Jazeera and News Agencies. (2026, Jan 22). Death toll in Pakistan shopping centre fire rises to at least 67: Officials. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2026/1/22/death-toll-in-pakistan-shopping-centre-fire-rises-to-at-least-60
Associated Press. (2026, June 6). 'Chained' Patient Among 13 Who Died In Sri Lanka Nursing Home Fire. NDTV. https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/chained-patient-among-13-who-died-in-sri-lanka-nursing-home-fire-11599141
Beck, U., 2006. Living in the world risk society: A Hobhouse Memorial Public Lecture given on Wednesday 15 February 2006 at the London School of Economics. Economy and society, 35(3): 329-345.
Bhan, G. 2019. ‘Notes on a Southern urban practice’. Environment and Urbanization 31 (2): 639–654 (https://doi.org/10.1177/0956247818815792) (accessed 20 March 2026).
McFarlane, C. 2012. Rethinking Informality: Politics, Crisis, and the City. Planning Theory & Practice, 13(1), 89–108. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649357.2012.649951
Pistor, K., 2025. The Law of Capitalism and how to Transform it. Yale University Press.
Roy, A. 2009. ‘Why India cannot plan its cities: Informality, insurgence and the idiom of urbanization’. Planning Theory 8 (1): 76–87. (https://doi.org/10.1177/1473095208099299) (accessed 12 March 2026).
Singh, Alok. (2026, June 4). In Delhi, anything goes’: What the owner of hotel where 21 died told police. The Indian Express. https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/delhi/malviya-nagar-hotel-fire-owner-statement-death-cops-10723499/

Devansh Shrivastava is an Assistant Professor at NMIMS Deemed to be University, Mumbai. His research interests include property-making, urban built environments and tenure changes in Indian cities. His research has been published in the Journal of Law and Society and PoLAR: Political and Legal Anthropology Review.



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